--转载注明来源 http://www.cnblogs.com/sysnap/
0x1 背景
往HOST文件添加127.0.0.1 www.baidu.com， 可以劫持百度的域名。病毒经常篡改HOST文件来劫持域名，有没一种办法，不动HOST文件，又可以针对指定的域名使其不受HOST文件的影响？
0x02研究
通常进程调用gethostbyname来解析域名的IP，这个API内部会RPC到svchost里面去，由svchost来完成请求，最终调用R_ResolverQuery来完成解析工作，R_ResolverQuery的定义是int __stdcall R_ResolverQuery(unsigned __int16 *Handle, unsigned __int16 *pwsName, unsigned __int16 wType, unsigned int Flags, _DnsRecord **ppResultRecords)，注意Flags，跟DnsQuery的fOptions是一样的，只要HOOK R_ResolverQuery， 判断pwsName是不是要保护的域名，然后给Flags或上DNS_QUERY_BYPASS_CACHE就可以了
0x03 R_ResolverQuery定位
定位R_ResolverQuery，这个函数是RPC IDL文件里面定义的，接口GUID为45776b01-5956-4485-9f80-f428f7d60129， 搜索dnsrslvr，找到45776b01-5956-4485-9f80-f428f7d60129特征就可以定位，具体的结构如下图所示
0x04 实现
一下是DLL的代码(XP测试通过，没测其它系统)，需要找一个注入进程工具把DLL注入到svchost里面去，注意svchost是带-k NetWorkService的那个。HOOK函数会判断当前的域名解析请求是不是name_bypass_hostfile，是的话就不走缓存了
// dllmain.cpp : Defines the entry point for the DLL application.
#include "stdafx.h"
#include <windows.h>
#include <Rpc.h>
#include <rpcdcep.h>
#include <RpcNdr.h>
#define DNS_IF_GUID_LEN 16
unsigned char DNS_IF_GUID_[DNS_IF_GUID_LEN] = { 0x01, 0x6b, 0x77, 0x45, 0x56, 0x59, 0x85, 0x44, 0x9f, 0x80, 0xf4, 0x28, 0xf7, 0xd6, 0x01, 0x29};
static const wchar_t* name_bypass_hostfile = L"www.baidu.com";
typedef int (__stdcall * pfnR_ResolverQuery)(
unsigned __int16 *Handle,
unsigned __int16 *pwsName,
unsigned __int16 wType,
unsigned int Flags,
void **ppResultRecords
);
typedef long ( __stdcall * SERVER_ROUTINE)();
static pfnR_ResolverQuery g_old_pfnR_ResolverQuery = NULL;
static void** g_off = NULL;
void** get_R_ResolverQuery_off(void* Base, size_t Limit)
{
PRPC_SERVER_INTERFACE srv_if = NULL;
void** _R_ResolverQuery = NULL;
__try
{
unsigned char* s_ptr = (unsigned char*)Base;
for(size_t i = 0; i < Limit; i++, s_ptr++)
{
if( 0 == memcmp(DNS_IF_GUID_, s_ptr, DNS_IF_GUID_LEN) )
{
srv_if = (PRPC_SERVER_INTERFACE)(s_ptr - sizeof(unsigned int));
PMIDL_SERVER_INFO InterpreterInfo = (PMIDL_SERVER_INFO)srv_if->InterpreterInfo;
if(InterpreterInfo)
{
const SERVER_ROUTINE * DispatchTable = InterpreterInfo->DispatchTable;
_R_ResolverQuery = (void**)&DispatchTable[0x09];
}
break;
}
}
}__except(1)
{
;
}
return _R_ResolverQuery;
}
int __stdcall
fake_R_ResolverQuery(
unsigned __int16 *Handle,
unsigned __int16 *pwsName,
unsigned __int16 wType,
unsigned int Flags,
void **ppResultRecords
)
{
#define DNS_QUERY_BYPASS_CACHE 0x08
unsigned int _Flags = Flags;
if(_wcsicmp(name_bypass_hostfile, (const wchar_t *)pwsName) == 0)
{
OutputDebugStringW((LPCWSTR)pwsName);
OutputDebugStringW(L"\n");
_Flags |= DNS_QUERY_BYPASS_CACHE;
}
return g_old_pfnR_ResolverQuery(Handle, pwsName, wType, _Flags, ppResultRecords);
}
void** hook_R_ResolverQuery(void* Base, size_t Limit, void** oldptr, pfnR_ResolverQuery hookptr)
{
void** rs = NULL;
pfnR_ResolverQuery* p_R_ResolverQuery = (pfnR_ResolverQuery*)get_R_ResolverQuery_off(Base, Limit);
if(p_R_ResolverQuery)
{
DWORD lpflOldProtect = 0;
BOOL result = VirtualProtect((void*)p_R_ResolverQuery, sizeof(PVOID),
PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, &lpflOldProtect);
if(result)
{
rs = (void**)p_R_ResolverQuery;
*oldptr = (void*)*p_R_ResolverQuery;
*p_R_ResolverQuery = hookptr;
VirtualProtect((void*)p_R_ResolverQuery, sizeof(PVOID),
lpflOldProtect, &lpflOldProtect);
}
}
return (void**)rs;
}
void unhook_R_ResolverQuery(void** off, void* Oldptr)
{
DWORD lpflOldProtect = 0;
BOOL result = VirtualProtect((void*)off, sizeof(PVOID),
PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, &lpflOldProtect);
if(result)
{
*off = Oldptr;
VirtualProtect((void*)off, sizeof(PVOID),
lpflOldProtect, &lpflOldProtect);
}
}
DWORD WINAPI hook_worker(
LPVOID lpParameter
)
{
if(lpParameter == (PVOID)1)
{
HMODULE hmod = ::GetModuleHandleA("dnsrslvr.dll");
if(hmod)
{
void* oldptr = NULL;
void** off = hook_R_ResolverQuery((void*)hmod, 45568, &oldptr, fake_R_ResolverQuery);
g_old_pfnR_ResolverQuery = (pfnR_ResolverQuery)oldptr;
g_off = off;
}
}else
{
(void)unhook_R_ResolverQuery(g_off, g_old_pfnR_ResolverQuery);
}
return 0;
}
BOOL APIENTRY DllMain( HMODULE hModule,
DWORD ul_reason_for_call,
LPVOID lpReserved
)
{
//
//DllMain创建线程，只要没任何等待线程的操作就是安全的，不会死锁.
//
switch (ul_reason_for_call)
{
case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH:
{
DWORD lpThreadId;
CreateThread(NULL, 0, hook_worker, (PVOID)1, 0, &lpThreadId);
}
break;
case DLL_THREAD_ATTACH:
break;
case DLL_THREAD_DETACH:
break;
case DLL_PROCESS_DETACH:
{
//
//暴力卸载是不安全的.
//
DWORD lpThreadId;
CreateThread(NULL, 0, hook_worker, (PVOID)0, 0, &lpThreadId);
}
break;
}
return TRUE;
}