问题描述
如果以下声明为真,那么所有文档都以HTTP标头 Content-Type的形式提供: 为text / html; charset = UTF-8 。
htmlspecialchars($ input,ENT_QUOTES,'UTF-8')(转换& , ,', ,> 到相应的命名HTML实体)不足以防止在Web服务器上生成HTML时出现跨站点脚本?
然而,还有其他类型的注入会导致XSS和:
lockquote
文档中没有< script>标记。
这种情况不会涵盖了JS注射的所有情况。例如,您可能有一个事件处理程序属性(需要在HTML转义内部进行JS转义):
< div onmouseover = alert('<?php echo htmlspecialchars($ xss)?>')> //不好!
更糟糕的是,一个javascript:link(需要JS内部转义 -
< a href =javascript:alert('<?php echo htmlspecialchars($ xss)?> ;')> //不好!
无论如何,通常最好避免使用这些构造,但特别是在模板化时。写作<?php echo htmlspecialchars(urlencode(json_encode($ something)))?>> 非常单调乏味。
不会保护您免遭一段JavaScript写入 innerHTML (通常 .html()在糟糕的jQuery脚本中)而不显式转义。
和...... XSS的原因不仅仅是注入。其他常见原因包括:
$ ul
允许用户创建链接,而不检查已知的URL方案( javascript:是最有名的有害方案,但还有更多)
故意允许用户创建标记,可以直接或通过光标记方案(如bbcode,这是总是可以利用的)
允许用户上传文件(可以通过各种方式重新解释为HTML或XML)
If the following statements are true,
- All documents are served with the HTTP header Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8.
- All HTML attributes are enclosed in either single or double quotes.
- There are no <script> tags in the document.
are there any cases where htmlspecialchars($input, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8') (converting &, ", ', <, > to the corresponding named HTML entities) is not enough to protect against cross-site scripting when generating HTML on a web server?
htmlspecialchars() is enough to prevent document-creation-time HTML injection with the limitations you state (ie no injection into tag content/unquoted attribute).
However there are other kinds of injection that can lead to XSS and:
this condition doesn't cover all cases of JS injection. You might for example have an event handler attribute (requires JS-escaping inside HTML-escaping):
<div onmouseover="alert('<?php echo htmlspecialchars($xss) ?>')"> // bad!
or, even worse, a javascript: link (requires JS-escaping inside URL-escaping inside HTML-escaping):
<a href="javascript:alert('<?php echo htmlspecialchars($xss) ?>')"> // bad!
It is usually best to avoid these constructs anyway, but especially when templating. Writing <?php echo htmlspecialchars(urlencode(json_encode($something))) ?> is quite tedious.
And... injection issues can happen on the client-side as well (DOM XSS); htmlspecialchars() won't protect you against a piece of JavaScript writing to innerHTML (commonly .html() in poor jQuery scripts) without explicit escaping.
And... XSS has a wider range of causes than just injections. Other common causes are:
allowing the user to create links, without checking for known-good URL schemes (javascript: is the most well-known harmful scheme but there are more)
deliberately allowing the user to create markup, either directly or through light-markup schemes (like bbcode which is invariably exploitable)
allowing the user to upload files (which can through various means be reinterpreted as HTML or XML)
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